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ticulars are legion, and the story appears much the same
in many parts of the country. Bodley ingeniously con-
nects these contemporary American concerns to the
hoary topic of sociocultural evolution. It occurs to him
that the economic growth and increasing concentration
of wealth and power going on today in his own backyard,
eastern Washington, can be viewed as an extension of
what has been going on worldwide ever since the earliest
emergence of political culture.
What explains this apparent continuity? Bodley sug-
gests that an answer can be found in the dynamics of
sociocultural evolution. A straightforward selectionist
approach presents a stumbling block, however. The prob-
lem, as Bodley recognizes, is that elites have ultimately
strengthened their hands in many and diverse environ-
ments. This makes it hard to specify the exogenous con-
ditions favoring their success. Speculation about a run-
away culture bias attempts to work around this diffi-
culty.
Endogenist theories avoid the problem of heteroge-
neous environments by modeling evolution as a matter
of self-organization. New structures emerge in response
to elementary motives such as population increase. C.
R. Hallpike (1988), who has written the most complete
theory of emergent sociocultural evolution to date, ar-
gues that change develops from ancient practices and
belief and follows paths of least resistance. These are
etched in part by psychological universals–in other
words, human nature.
Bodley rejects the idea that the increasing proportion
of poor and powerless in society is natural and invokes
directed evolution. Elite-directed sociocultural evolu-
tion, as he imagines it, involves the promotion of values
and policies favoring growth, which in the long run serve
no one but the elites themselves.
Is this a falsifiable theory? Bodley characterizes his
research as a hypothesis test, but does it not reveal
merely another instance of scaling law—the tendency
for the quantity of something to be inversely propor-
tional to its rank among like things? We know that the
distributions of wealth and income conform to this pat-
tern. George Zipf, who originally discovered scaling,
thought it applied only to human behavior and artifacts.
Subsequently researchers have found many examples in
physics and biology (Gell-Mann 1994:92–97). Scaling is
an empirical phenomenon. Nobody at this point can ex-
plain it generally, let alone identify its implications for
the study of elites and their influence on society.
The problem is one of systems within systems, making
it difficult to say where change originates. The often-
heard assertion that change begins with the individual
is too facile. A way of life must provide the individual
with a motive to change, alternative visions, and the
wherewithal to experiment. In the United States there
has been a counterculture dedicated to down-sizing for
many years. Relegated mainly to art and a few isolated
corners of science, it has seldom been taken seriously.
Even as recently as ten years ago, almost nobody where
I live questioned locating a large automobile factory on
the edge of town. The incentives offered to the company
to build there were regarded as investments destined to
pay big dividends. The community looked forward to
growing. Today the politicians speak much more cau-
tiously about growth, and antidevelopment voices have
become every bit as loud as those favoring more business
and industry. Is this the result of disappointments with
the results of growth and development? Is it because elite
developers have lost their monopoly over planning as the
area has become increasingly metropolitan? Is it because
a fair measure of prosperity in recent years has taken
away the incentive for growth?
The situation is complicated at the local level. At a
higher level, one would expect simpler rules. Neverthe-
less, social scientists always have to be skeptical of the
too-simple, the single-factor explanation, and that
weighs heavily against Bodley’s theory of elite-directed
evolution.
david hyndman
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Bodley’s culture-scale approach, which places foragers,
tribals, chiefdoms, agrarian civilizations, and globally in-
tegrated commercial cultures within a single explana-
tory framework, contributes significantly to anthropo-
logical analysis. I agree with him that it is appropriate
to speak in terms of difference in cultural scale when
referring to domestic, political, and commercial means
of organizing the distribution of social power. I likewise
think that commoditization of property was a key first
step in the concentration of social power under the cap-
italist mode of production and that economic growth
should be viewed as a humanly directed “cultural,” not
a “natural,” process. The extensive theoretical review of
the relationships among culture, power, and scale tends,
however, to privilege coevolutionary and biocultural per-
spectives over political economy and mode-of-produc-
tion viewpoints. Bodley acknowledges that Marxist the-
orists similarly treat growth as a humanly directed
process involving social power. Capitalists competing
with one another and workers lacking class-conscious-
ness are inappropriately dismissed as a Marxist meth-
odological shortcoming, because they are equally appli-
cable to cultural scale and power-elite theory. Wolf’s
(1982) kinship, tributary, and capitalist mode-of-produc-
tion analysis receives relatively little discussion. More-
over, the cultural-economies perspective is overlooked;
Halperin (1994), for example, shows that the “Kentucky
Way” of householding articulates reciprocity, redistri-
bution, and market exchange. The discussion of polities’
becoming too large to be efficiently sustained against
competing counterhegemonies could have acknowl-
edged relevant globalization and localization theory on
production of identity (e.g., Friedman 1994) and Fourth
World theory on the role of nations in state breakup and
breakdown (e.g., Nietschmann 1994).
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Bodley makes a compelling argument that the shift to
transnational commercial empires has had enormous
significance for humanity but has received remarkably
little attention from anthropologists. His ethnographic
case study provides welcome new research on the house-
hold- and local-community-level impact of increase in
scale in the Palouse region. His research moves beyond
the contradictory findings of sociology and economics,
embracing the repatriation of anthropology as cultural
critique (see Marcus and Fischer 1986).
Scale of place is identified as an important dimension
of the research. The Palouse is acknowledged as one of
the world’s richest soft-wheat-producing regions. The
American invasion of the domestically organized forag-
ing cultures started in the 19th century and ended in
1910 with virtually all the arable land under cultivation.
It is interesting that urban places rather than the rural
places of dunelike wheat-covered hills are chosen as the
appropriate unit for the study of social power in this
affluent agricultural region. I wonder if the urban elites
enjoy more social power in the region than the farmers.
I am reminded of The Northern Plainsmen (Bennett
1969) in the nearby Montana border region, where ranch-
ers enjoyed greater social power than farmers and the
Hutterite and Cree communities.
While a postgraduate student at the University of
Idaho in the early 1970s I was a resident of one of the
no-growth Palouse villages seen as an unattractive place
for investment by the remote urban property elites. I
become enveloped in community mutual support net-
works, and villagers regularly acknowledged that they
were more self-sufficient and needed less money to live
well in the village than elsewhere in America. My short-
term insider perspective coincides with Bodley’s obser-
vation that the poor households of the remote Palouse
villages did seem to have twice as much property on
average as the poor households in the larger urban places.
Urban growth in the Palouse region appears to improve
living standards significantly for relatively few poor
households.
Bodley’s ethnography reinforces the conclusion that
development is a human rights issue and an access and
distribution problem. The paper importantly contributes
to our understanding of the worsening biocultural di-
versity crisis as an insidious outcome of contemporary
commercially organized, globally integrated cultures
(e.g., Hyndman 1994).
james h. mc donald
Division of Behavioral and Cultural Sciences,
University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, Tex.
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Bodley has written a theoretically ambitious, methodo-
logically detailed, and data-driven paper on social com-
plexity, power, and elite formation. His rigorous analysis
of economic growth accompanying increases in social
scale and how these processes lead to the increasing con-
centration of power and wealth in the hands of an ever-
smaller number of elite players is a very useful contri-
bution to a more nuanced theoretical understanding of
social evolutionary processes. His overall conclusion
may sound intuitive to many of us, and, in fact, many
scholars make these claims, but what he effectively dem-
onstrates through his Palouse case is how this actually
operates. And while he is cautious about generalizing his
case outside of eastern Washington (appropriately rec-
ognizing the importance of historical contingency and
human agency so often missing in the more macro-ori-
ented approaches taken, for example, by economists),
having lived in the deindustrializing Midwest and in
South Texas I found much to relate to in this article.
Indeed, the study of places such as Laredo and San An-
tonio would make for a very interesting comparison.
Both of these metropolitan areas are booming, yet one
cannot help but be struck by the increasing poverty in
the company of marked concentration of wealth in the
hands of the local power elite. (This process is even more
striking in Laredo, which lacks a robust middle class that
might otherwise veil the process.)
My reading of this paper came at an opportune time.
I had recently entered the field to conduct research on
globalization and small-scale commercial agriculture in
Mexico under conditions of rapid change and found that
Bodley’s analytical framework engaged a number of pro-
cesses that are emerging in the rural sector, most notably
in the form of elites’ attempting to promote and control
economic growth. Mexico provides an interesting ad-
dendum to Bodley’s primarily U.S. contextualization of
the processes of the concentration and centralization of
wealth and power in that it underscores that this process
(1) is anything but linear and (2) subsumes the complex
relationships of power elites at regional, national, and
transnational levels.
The global economy arrived with particular ferocity
in Mexico. The aggressive implementation of neoliberal
reforms by the administration of Carlos Salinas
(1988–94) dismantled the state-centered economic sys-
tem with incredible speed, culminating with the imple-
mentation of NAFTA in January 1994. In the wake of
these major changes, the magic of the free market has
failed so remarkably that even once prosperous com-
mercial agricultural sectors face collapse. In the new
market-centered model of development, the Mexican
state shifted its social welfare burden onto individual
farmers and effectively got out of the agriculture busi-
ness. What ensued was widespread economic failure in
the agricultural economy across diverse sectors and
regions. Five years after the implementation of NAFTA,
what seems to be emerging is an interesting variant of
what Bodley describes as the weak state dominated by
powerful private corporate interests in a country where
the division between civil and political society is often
murky at best. The state is getting back into the agri-
culture business, and what appears to be emerging is a
curious alliance between the state and the rural elite. In
the Mexican case, however, the state is not simply cre-
ating policies that advantage the rural elite. It also wants
its share of the profits generated by the agricultural sec-
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